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THE NAVAHO INDIANS: LAND AND OIL

By LAWRENCE C. KELLY *
I
HE TREATY signed by the Navahos and the federal govern~
ment in 1868 gave the Indians 3,414,528 acres of land in
northwestern New Mexico and northeastern Arizona. Because this grant was not large enough to accommodate the
many members of the tribe, the reservation was expanded by
presidential orders until in 1911 it embraced 12,189,997
acres. In 1913 and again in 1918 further expansion was prohibited by Congress.
Despite these restrictions, the Navahos and their sheep
continued to increase. Several plans to sidestep the Congressional limitations were attempted by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs after 1912, but these efforts were, in the main, fruitless. Then, in 1922, oil was discovered on the reservation and
the Navaho dream of additional land promised to 'become a
reality for Congress could not forbid the Navahos to purchase land with their own funds. Opposition did appear, however, when an attempt was made to wrest title to the oil lands
from the Indians. A bitter fight ensued, but in 1927 the
Navaho title to the oil and to the land from which it came
was upheld by Congress. This victory, confirming the Navaho
claim to those portions of the reservation created by presidential executive order, represented a significant change in
federal Indian policy which, since the passage of the Dawes
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Act in 1887, had sought to break up the Indian reservation
system.
Shortly after 1927 the revenues from oil began to dwindle
but they proved enough to stimulate a reservation expansion
program which resulted in the present, apparently definitive,
boundaries of the reservation.
II
In 1878, 1880, 1884, 1900, and 1901, the original Navaho
reservation was enlarged. These additions were not concluded
by treaty but rather by executive order of the president. An
executive order reservation differed considerably from a
treaty reservation; whereas the latter necessarily received
the blessing of Congress, through the Senate, the executive
order reservation was solely the creation of the president-Congress was given no opportunity to accept or rej ect his decision. Title to a treaty reservation was vested by law in the
Indians. Title was not clearly given to them by executive order; certain lands were simply withdrawn from the public
domain and set aside for Indian usage. Although custom accorded the Indians title to the executive order reservations,
the legality of this interpretation was never tested prior to
1922.
An executive order reservation was a vague thing in other
ways. For instance, the orders creating the 1878 and 1880
reservations clearly specified that the land was for Navaho
use only, but the order which created the Hopi reservation
in 1882 stated that the Secretary of the Interior could settle
other Indians (presumably Navahos) upon the land if he saw
fit. Again, the executive order of 1884, while setting aside
land for "Indian purposes," made no specific mention of any
Indian tribe, while that of 1900 temporarily withdrew certain
lands until the "Indians" there were alloted under the Dawes
Act. The executive order of 1901 simply withdrew the land
"until further notice"and made no mention of Indians at all. 1
Despite the vagueness of these orders, all the withdrawals
1. Printed copies of the various executive orders can be found in Charles J. Kappler.
Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties. 5 Vols. (Washington: G.p.a., 1904-1938).
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mentioned above were considered Navaho property in 1901.
The only qualification to Navaho ownership of the executive order reservations prior to the 1920's lay in the area
known as the "checkerboard." 2 In certain of the executive order reservations alternate sections of the land belonged. not
to the Navahos but to two railroad companies: the Santa Fe
and _the St. Louis and San Francisco or the Frisco. Their
claims dated back to the time of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Co. land grant in 1866, thus antedating the Navaho
grants. Because of these overlapping grants, the southern region of the Navaho country was in reality part Navaho and
part railroad land. In the absence of a survey, the Navahos
lived where they pleased, railroad land or not. There was little
friction in the nineteenth century because the area was riot
desired by whites, but after 1900 cattlemen began to lease
large portions of the railroad lands.
In 1904 an attempt was made to solve the problems of the
checkerboard. A rider attached to the Indian Appropriation
Bill provided that where private (railroad) land was included within an executive order Indian reservation, such
-land could be exchanged by the interested party for "vacant,
nonmineral, nontimbered, surveyed public land of equal area
and value situated in the same state or territory" (33 Stat.,
211). The law was advantageous to both the Navahos and the
railroads. No trouble was anticipated in effecting the ex'changes. After leisurely negotiations the Santa Fe, on J anuary 16, 1913, recorded a deed for the transfer of 327,000 acres
in the area of the 1900 and 1901 reservations and proceeded
to claim its lieu lands.
The surprise of the Santa Fe officials must have been great
when the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior refused
to recognize the deed. He did so on the ground that the act of
1904 did not apply to the 1900 and 1901 withdrawals because
these areas had not been set aside as Indian reservations, but
were only temporary withdrawals for Indian use. The Santa
Fe thereupon withdrew its application for transfer and the
2. The best treatment of the checkerboard problem is Sanford Mosk, Land Tenure
Problems in the Santa Fe Railroad Grant Area (Berkeley: University of California Pres••
1944) .
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matter was temporarily dropped. 3 What could have been a
test case for the exact status of these executive order reservations was thereby postponed.
Even more perplexing than the problem of the checkerboard was the status of several thousand Navahos to the east
and south of the reservation who, since the time of their return from the Bosque Redondo, had been living outside any
reservation boundaries, treaty or executive order, and who
were, in reality, squatters on the public domain. This situation was serious for several reasons. For one, the number of
'Navahos involved was quite large. Although there was never
a scientific census of the Navahos prior to 1929, observers in
the early 1900's variously estimated their number in these
areas at between 3,000 and 6,000 souls, a sizeable group.4 For
a second reason, the interest of the cattlemen in these areas,
as in the checkerboard, had increased sharply after 1900
when the development of artesian wells made grazing profitable. The railroad companies were beginning to lease large
portions of their alternate holdings and the new proprietors
were in no mood to tolerate the Navaho squatters. Friction
quickly developed. Threatened by the white invasion of their
traditional grazing area, the Navahos appealed to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Francis Leupp, for aid. In 1906
Leupp visited the area personally and reviewed the plight of
the Navahos. He returned to Washington to urge executive
order action. I>
Leupp's arguments were blunted by the white interests
and a compromise was the best he could obtain. The Navahos
were to be given a chance to file on the land under the provisions of either the Dawes Act or the Homestead Act while
8. The history of this transaction and the opinion of the Solicitor are contained in a
letter from J. H. Edwards, Solicitor, to the Secretary of the Interior, fehruary 9, 1924, in
the National Archives, Record Group 71>, Central Classified Files, Navaho Reservation,
7126-22-818. (Unless otherwise indicated, future references to the National Archives will
be to Record Group 75, Central Classified Files, and the citation will be abbreviated to
include only the jurisdiction and the file number, i.e., Navaho, 7126-22-313.)
,
4. E. M. Sweet to E. B. Meritt, July 24, 1915, Pueblo Bonito, unnumbered report in
the 160-169 file. See also the National Archives, Record Group 75, Board of Indian Commissioners, Special Reports, Vol. 2, Feilruary 15, 1919 (Hereafter cited as BIC, Special
Reports).
5. Testimony of Anselm Weber in U. S. House, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearing.,
Indians of the United State., Vol. 8, 66th Cong., I-3d sees., 1920, p. 707.
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the land was temporarily withdrawn from white entry. Once
the Indians received allotments, the remainder of the area
was to be restored to the public domain and opened to white
entry. On November 9, 1907, a large tract of land in both
Arizona and New Mexico was withdrawn. 6
This compromise was very unpopular in New Mexico
where opposition to federal control was growing and the
statehood bandwagon was gathering steam. By 1911 sufficient pressure was brought to bear on President Taft to
cause him to issue another executive order restoring to the
public domain all the land in the 1907 withdrawal area in
New Mexico. Arizona apparently made no opposition to the
original withdrawal and as a result the land there remained
in a withdrawn status until 1934.
The attempt to allot Navaho land under the 1907 withdrawal plan was a failure. The original plan of the Indian
Bureau was a good one for it recognized that the Navahos
could not continue to live in the area if they were confined to
160 acres per family. Accordingly, the Bureau planned to secure control of the entire area for them by judiciously alloting land that contained water. 8 There were, however, serious
flaws in the enactment of the plan. ,
In the first place, many of the waterholes were discovered
to be on the railroad land. A more serious problem was the
discovery, after the withdrawal was voided by Taft, that
many of the Navahos who had filed applications for allotment
during the grace period had somehow filed them on railroad
land. Both of these difficulties could conceivably have been
overcome by application for transfer under the act of 1904,
but such application was not made prior to Taft's restoration.
At that time the act of 1904 became inoperative because it
applied only to lands in executive order status. Thus, in 1911
the majority of the Navahos in New Mexico were still without
title to their traditional grazing lands. Because of bungling
6. U. S. Senate (Herbert J. Hagerman), The Navajo Indian Reservation, Doc. 64,
72d Cong., 1st sess., 1932, pp. 6-7 (Hereafter cited as Hagerman Report.)
[Through an oversight there is no footnote No.7. Ed.]
8. H. J. Hagerman to Senator A. A. Jones, November 26, 1923, Pueblo Bonito, 7490723-308.3. Also Mosk. Land Tenure Problems in the Santa Fe Railroad Grant Area. Pp. 18-19;
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administration of the withdrawal order of 1907 and legal
technicalities within the Department of the Interior, the
Navahos on the eve of statehood for Arizona and New Mexico were in little better position than they had been at the
turn of the century.
Between the time of Taft's restoration and the admission
of New Mexico and Arizona to statehood in 1912, the Indian
Bureau attempted to correct its past errors by extending the
provisions of the Dawes Act to the Navahos residing on the
public domain without the formality of an executive order
withdrawal. 9 This interpretation, obviously a desperate maneuver to salvage something from the earlier failure, was
quickly criticized by both friends and enemies of the Navahos.
White persons in the Southwest charged that the interpretation was unwarranted and illegal. Various eastern Indian
associations looked upon it as unwise because it implied that
the Indian land needs could be satisfied by a 160-acre allotment. lO New Mexico's answer to this new strategy came
shortly after statehood was attained. The first memorial of
the first state legislature called upon the United States Congress to allot in severalty the Navaho reservation and to open
the "surplus lands" of that preserve to white entry.n As the
New Mexican opposition to the allotment policy increased,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs decided in October, 1912,
to discontinue the work pending a complete investigation of
the problem by Congress. 12
In 1913, as a result of an attack upon the Navaho land
holdings by Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, the Bureau's proposed investigation seemed to be at hand. Fall con9. The evolution of this novel and legally dubious interpretation is outlined in a letter
from Commissioner Sells to T. A. Andreon of Leupp, January 12, 1915, in Hagerman
Report, pp. 67-68. Sells dates the genesis of this interpretation prior to 1908, but the comments of Senator Albert B. Fall before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on June 5,
1915, indicate that it was not invoked in behalf of the Navahos until after the failure of
the 1907 withdrawal scheme. U. S. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings, Indian
Appropriation Bill, FiBcal19H, 6Sd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, PP. 502-503.
10. For opinion in New Mexico and Arizona See the remainder of Fall's statement in
footnote #9 .above. For a statement of the eastern position see J. Weston Allen to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 7, 1913, Navaho 55414-14-150.
11. For a copy of the memorial see Navaho, 3368-12-308.1.
12. F. H. Abbott to Senator Benjamin F. Shively, October 9, 1912, Navaho 9807-12S08.1.
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tended that the Navahos had plenty of land on the reservation (1,100 acres for each man, woman, and child, he said)
and that the Bureau's plan was simply an encouragement
for Indian blackmail of white stockholders. 13 Fall's argument
was a compound of half-truths and scrambled statistics, but
it was sufficient to cause the Senate Indian Affairs Committee
to hesitate in supporting the Bureau plan. The Committee decided, in the face of conflicting evidence, to prohibit the use of
public funds for Navaho allotments on the public domain in
Arizona and New Mexico ·for the coming year. The Bureau
endorsed the plan "pending an investigation." The Commissioner of Indian Affairs obviously believed that the investigation would confirm the necessity for more land. Fall was
equally sure that an investigation would bear out his
arguments. 14
As a result of this compromise, a proviso was inserted
into the Indian Appropriations bill for fiscal 1914 which
stated that
no part of said sum shall be used .. for allotment of any
land in severalty upon the public domain to any Indian,
whether of the Navajo or other tribe, within the State of New
Mexico and the State of Arizona. (38 Stat., 78)

When the Senate met to discuss the Navaho problem the
following year, -the Indian Bureau had undergone a change
of personnel. The new Assistant Commissioner, E. B. Meritt, when testifying on the Navaho situation, seemed unaware
that the Bureau's acceptance of the Fall proviso the year
before had been based on the assumption that the Navahos
living on the public domain had been there since their return
from the Bosque Redondo and before. Like Fall, Meritt told
the committee that these Navahos had "voluntarily left the
reservation to go on the public domain in order that they
might make a better living for themselves."15 Nor did Meritt
13. See Fall's statement above, footnote #9, and a similar comment in the Congres.
sional Record. Vol. 49, 63d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7031·33.
14. U. S. Senate, Hearings, Indian Appropriations BiU, Fiscal 1914. PP. 502·507.
15. U. S. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs. Hearings. Indian App1'opriaticm BiU.
Fiscal 1915. 63d Cong., 2d sess.• 1914, p. 297.
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repeat the request for an investigation. In addition, Senator
Fall now found support from the Arizona delegation. Senator
Henry F. Ashurst introduced a new issue into the controversy
when he complained that the pressure of the Navaho allotment scheme was being made "not for the benefit of the Indians but that the coffers of a vast corporation may be still
further filled." The' corporation to which Ashurst referred
was the Santa Fe Railroad. He charged that the act of 1904
had been passed at the behest of the company, and that under
it the state of Arizona had been short-changed some 370,000
acres of its best land. This pressure for additional land for
the Navahos on the public domain, he intimated, was simply
a prelude to the issuance of another executive order withdrawal which would pave the way for the Santa Fe to reap
additional profits.16
With no one to defend the earlier Bureau position, the
Navaho cause was seriously compromised. An agreement to
which both Fall and Meritt subscribed was concluded whereby
only those Navahos who were residing on the public domain
prior to June 30, 1913, were to receive allotments. Annually
thereafter until 1933 this stipulation was incorporated into
the Indian Appropriation actsY ,
What happened behind the scenes, if anything, is not evident. What is clear, however, is that the compromise was in
fact no compromise at all. It was at best a concession, and at
worst a betrayal of the Navaho need for land. If it had been
true since 1906 that 160 acres was not enough for the nonreservation Navahos, that fact had not changed in 1914. Unless the land could be alloted so that the Navahos controlled
more than the minimum allotment acreage, which seemed
unlikely now, they could not make a living. The Fall-Meritt
compromise meant simply that the Navahos must be satisfied
with less land than they needed and that the stockmen of New
16. Ibid., p. 294. Ashurst offered no evidence of such a plot and, in light of the Bureau's
failure to take advantage of the 1904 act during the grace period of the 1907 withdrawal,
his contention would seem to be at least questionable.
17. Ibid., PP. 464·465. See also, Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law
(Washington: ~.P.O., 1945), pp. 392·393.
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Mexico and Arizona had won an important victory over them.
Once again the Indian Bureau set out to salvage what it
could. Special agents were sent into the non-reservation areas
to allot land to as many Navahos as could qualify under the
Fall rider. By 1916 an inspector in the field could report that
in the Pueblo Bonito region of New Mexico 2,900 allotments
had been applied for. 1s
This project too was doomed to failure. Indian allotments
under the Dawes Act were neither approved nor patented by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs but by the General Land Office,
and the latter was not so lenient toward the Indians. Certain
improvements and residence requirements were necessary before title was granted and the Navahos, a semi-nomadic people, often did little about either. Despite the large number of
allotments, the Commissioner was also informed that all of
the 2,900 allotments "may be cancelled for lack of residence
or lack of conformity with other requirements." 19 Furthermore, the method of allotment was arousing the ire of the
whites. Because of the railroad sections, Indian agents were
forced to go farther away from the original Navaho grazing
areas in search of suitable land. As the Indian allotments
penetrated farther and farther into the public domain, the
white stockmen resented more and more the Indian encroachment on land which they hoped to control.
The situation grew steadily worse after 1914. In 1918 Superintendent Janus of Leupp stated that he was "powerless"
to plan for the future until the land situation was solved: "until this is done, all is uncertainty." The Board of Indian Commissioners sent one of its members to the field to make a first.hand report. His comments were not optimistic:
It is inconceivable that the Government can ever successfully
adopt a policy of allotment for the Navajos. To attempt to do
so would speedily reduce the majority of them to pauperism,
and convert an independent, self sustaining people 'into a class
of dependents.
18. S. A. M. Young to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 2, 1916, Pueblo
Bonito, unnumbered report in the 160-169 file.
19. Ibid.
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I most strongly recommend that the Board urge upon the Government the wisdom of changing the status of this land to that
of an Indian reservation. 2o

These reports and others of a similar nature caused the Bureau to resolve in 1918 to meet the white opposition head on.
Recommendation would be made for the creation of another
executive order reservation.
Before this plan could be submitted, however, the Bureau's hands were tied by Congress. Word of the proposed
reservation traveled swiftly to the Senate where the Arizona
representatives decided the matter had gone far enough. In
March, 1918, during debate on the Indian appropriation bill,
Senator Marcus A. Smith of Arizona proposed an amendment
from the floor which provided that "hereafter no Indian reservation shall be created, nor shall any addition be made to
one heretofore created, within the limits of the States of New
Mexico or Arizona, except by Act of Congress." 21 The amendment was accepted by both houses without opposition. (40
Stat., 575), and one year later the prohibition was extended
to all the states (41 Stat., 34). A melancholy note by Superintendent Stacher of Pueblo Bonito summed up the situation:
The plan to extend the reservation has been blocked. No
one in politics seems to care a rap what becomes of the Navajos
and is willing to see him crowded out from his little range in
the desert where he has been content to plug along. Where
is the law maker that raises his voice in their behalf? 22

The executive branch of the government was now severely
limited in its program to provide the Navahos with adequate
land. New excutive order reservations were forbidden, and
so were exchanges under the act of 1904 since the Smith rider
provided that no new additions could be made to previously
20. For the report of Superintendent Janus see National Archives, Record Group 75,
Annual Narrative Reports, Leupp Reservation, 1918, p. 6 (Hereafter cited as Annual Narrative Report). For the report of Commissioner Frank Knox, dated May 28, 1917, see
Leupp, 58075-17-150.
21. Congressional Record, Vol. 56, 65th Cong., 2d sess., p. 4194.
22. Annual Narrative Report, Pueblo Bonito, 1918, p. 5.
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existing reservations. Several possibilities, none very satisfactory, remained. A cursory analysis of these plans will demonstrate their shortcomings.
Those Navahos who were resident on the public domain
prior to June 30, 1913, could still be alloted land, but greater
care would have to be exercised to comply with the regulations of the General Land Office. The futility of earlier work
in this field was revealed in 1919 in a report by special agent
A. W. Simington who had been sent into the field in 1918 to
survey the status of the earlier allotment applications. Despite the earlier allotment figure, Simington could find records for only 2,410 applications. Of these, 618 had been approved and only 100 patented. Even worse, the agent who had
made a survey and issued allotment certificates to Navahos
between Thoreau, New Mexico; and the Arizona state line
"never filed any of these applications in the local Land Office,
so that hundreds of Navahos think they are alloted but there
is no official record." 23 Allotment work could begin again,
but as a means of controlling the public domain its work was
clearly done.
Another alternative was to request funds from Congress
to purchase land outright for the Navahos' benefit. In 1919
Commissioner Cato Sells himself went before Congress to
urge this idea. He was given $100,000 (41 Stat., 423), but
the money was not a grant. It was to be reimbursed by the
Navahos at a future date. Since they had no money, it was
fruitless to talk of further grants. 24
The most promising solution to the growing friction 25 be23. Simington to Sells, December 18, 1919, Pueblo Bonito, 65898-18-304.
24. The money was used to purchase 12,000 acres near Gallup, New Mexico. The story
of the transaction is related in the correspondence of October 31, 1922, and June 23, 1927,
in Navaho, 17824-16-371, part 3.
25. General Hugh L. Scott of the Board of Indian Commissioners reported in 1921
that "the feeling between the two interests has been very strong, and both sides are well
armed .•. the situation any day may result in a serious clash because of" the failure of
the Department to settle the problem equitably." "They charge (the Navahos] that the
white stockmen are fencing the country, that the cow boys employed by white stockmen
threatened children and older people and took cattle having Indian brands; that cow boys
tore down hogans and Indian fences and that the cattlemen took possession of springs and
waterholes so that the Indians could not get water for their sheep." BIC, Special Reports,
Vol. 4, PP. 49-56.
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tween the whites and the Navahos in the non-reservation
areas was a plan to "block" the checkerboard. By "blocking"
it was envisioned that all railroad sections in a given area
would be given to the Navahos in exchange for their allotments in another area. In this way both railroad and Navaho
land holdings could be consolidated into several large
"blocks" and the friction occasioned by the checkerboard
obviated. Sentiment for this plan was strong by 1920.
Blocking, however, was obviously no solution to the Navaho land problem, for it meant the loss of half the land the
Navahos had previously used. Despite this obvious drawback
the Indian Bureau, apparently believing that the increasing
violence in the area had to be solved before any appeal for
additional land could be made, joined in 1921 to support a
measure providing for the consolidation of the non-reservation allotments in New Mexico where the conflict was most
aggravated (41 Stat., 1239). The law applied to the three
New Mexico counties of McKinley, San Juan, and Valencia,
all of which had been involved in the 1907 withdrawal order.
Despite support from both sides, no exchanges were effected
under the law until 1931, because subsequent regulations issued by the Indian Bureau were so complicated as to make
compliance nearly impossible.26 Such was the Navaho land
situation on the eve of the discovery of oil.

III
The oil that was discovered on the Navaho reservation
on September 24, 1922, was located near the eastern edge of
the original treaty reservation in the vicinity of Shiprock,
New Mexico. 27 Interest in the discovery was such that by
mid-October the local agent, Evan Estep, reported to the
Commissioner that his agency was being overrun "by all
26. H. J. Hagerman to C. J. Rhoads, August I, 1931, Navaho 64874-34-066.
27. Contrary to the statement of John Collier in his Indians of the Americas (New
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1947), p. 247, that it was discovered on the "presidential
decree," i.e., executive order portion.
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kinds and classes of speculators, fly-by-nights, bootleggers,
and other forms of criminals"28 who sought to cover the
Navaho lands with applications for leases. Estep's problems
were compounded by a recent decision of the Secretary of
the Interior which opened all Indian reservations, executive
order as well as treaty, to oil prospecting and leasing.
Since 1891 there was an act which permitted the leasing
of mineral deposits on treaty reservations. The law provided
that "where lands are occupied by Indians who have bought
and paid for the same" and where such lands were not needed
for farming or were not desired for individual allotment, they
might be leased by "the authority of the council speaking for
s~ch Indians, in such quantities and upon such terms as the
agent in charge may recommend, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior" (26 Stat., 795). The Department of the Interior subsequently ruled that the phrase
"bought and paid for the same" applied to treaty reservations, but not to executive order reservations.
After the turn of the century attempts were made to open
the executive order reservations on terms similar to those
contained in the act of 1891. With the admission of Arizona
to statehood the tempo of this movement increased. Between
1912 and 1919, however, the Arizona delegation in Congress
found its efforts stymied by a powerful group of western
Senators who were desperately attempting to stave off the
demands of eastern conservationists that the public domain
be leased rather than deeded to successful prospectors. These
western spokesmen consistently maintained that the approval
of a leasing bill for the executive order reservations would
encourage the drive for leasing the public domain, and they
refused the Arizona appeal. Important for our purposes is
the equally consistent contention of the Arizona and New
Mexico representatives that there was no true parallel between the two bills, because title to executive order reservations was vested in the Indians in much the same fashion as
28. Estep to Burke, October 19, 1922, San Juan, 83819-21-327.
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title to the treaty reservations. 29 This argument was somehow forgotten after 1922 when the opportunity presented
itself to challenge the Navaho title to the potentially oil-rich
executive order reservations.
In 1919 the opposition to leasing the public domain collapsed, and shortly thereafter the executive order reservations were opened to leasing for metaliferous minerals (41
Stat., 31). No mention was made of oil, for apparently there
was no prospect of its discovery. However, an act which applied to the discovery of oil on the public domain was passed
shortly after the Metaliferous Minerals bill, and this act was
later to threaten Navaho oil rights.
.
The General Leasing Act of 1920 was a victory for the
forces of conservation. Henceforth, title to public lands would
not be granted to successful prospectors. Instead, in the case
of oil, the most a prospector could expect would be a lease
to one-fourth of his find at a maximum 5ro royalty, and a
preferential right to the remainder at a minimum 12.5%.
Royalties collected under this act were to be divided between
the reclamation fund and the state.in which the oil was located in a ratio of 52.5% to 37.5%, with 10% set aside for
administrative expenses. The state's percentage was to be
used for the construction and maintenance of public roads or
the support of public schools (41 Stat., 437). At the time no
mention was made of the applicability of the General Leasing
Act to executive order Indian ,reservations. This ingenious
interpretation was reserved for the fertile mind of Albert B.
Fall, Secretary of the Interior in the Harding cabinet after
March 4, 1921.
On January 14, 1922, one E. M. Harrison applied for an
oil prospecting permit covering a portion of the Navaho reservation withdrawn from the public domain by the executive
order of May 17, 1884. His application was rejected by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office who ruled, first,
29. For a sampling of these arguments see: Congressional Record, Vol. 53, 64th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 13777; Ibid., Vol. 56, 65th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7894; U. S. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Metaliferou8 Minerals on Indian Reservations, 64th Cong., 2d
sess., 1918, Rept. 880, p. 3.

THE NAVAHO INDIANS: LAND AND OIL

15

that he had no jurisdiction over Indian lands, and secondly,
that there was no law permitting the lease of executive order
reservations for oil or gas. There is no evidence to indicate
Harrison's motives, but he was not daunted by the Commissioner's decision. He insisted that he had filed his application
under the provisions of the General Leasing Act, and he appealed the decision directly to Secretary Fall. In other words,
Harrison maintained that the executive order reservation
was properly a part of the public domain, not the Navaho
reservation. 30
Secretary Fall accepted Harrison's argument after review, and in June, 1922, endorsed a bill for opening the executive order portions "within the Navaho Reservation in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, to oil and gas mining leases"
on terms similar to those contained in the General Leasing
Act. Fall's bill would have modified the General Leasing Act
only to the extent that instead of dividing the royalties between the state and the reclamation fund, the Indians would
also be included and royalties would be split equally between
the three. On June 5, 1922, Fall testified in behalf of the bill:
It is my opinion that the provisions of the General Leasing law of February' 25, 1920, are applicable to deposits of
oil and gas within executive order Indian reservations, because
of the fact that such reservations are merely public lands
temporarily withdrawn by Executive order.31

When the House failed to act promptly on his bill, Fall
took matters into his own hands and on June 9, 1922, issued
an administrative order which placed all executive order Indian reservations under the provisions of the General Leasing
Act. In so doing he reiterated his earlier testimony, stating
that since these reservations had in the past been restored to
entry by various presidents, they were obviously in the Indian
30. The pertinent documents in this case are printed in Daniel M. Green (ed.). Decisions of the Department of the Interior in Cases Relating to the Public Domain, Vol. 49
(Washington: G.p.a., 1923). pp. 139-146.
31. U. S. House, Committee on Indian' Affairs. Hearings, Leasing Unalloted Navajo
Lands, 67th Cong•• 2d sess., 1922, p. 1. See also Fall to Homer Snyder, June 7, 1922, Navaho.
44987-22-013.
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custody only temporarily.32 Thus when oil was discovered on
the edge of the treaty reservation in September, 1922, there
were many who took advantage of the Fall ruling to make application on the executive order portion as well.
An important by-product of the discovery of oil was the
creation of the Navaho Tribal Council. Before the discovery
Washington concerned itself but little with the need for
Navaho representative government. As a result of the executive-order additions to the reservation after 1868 the Indian
Bureau had divided the reservation into five sub-agencies by
1908, thus creating a situation which did little to promote
tribal political unity.33 When the prospectors first entered the
reservation in late 1919 or early 1920, there was no tribal
council in existence to deal with them. 34
To comply with the law, a council was hastily summoned
in the San Juan sub-agency where most of the interest was
centered. This San Juan Council made no pretense of representing all the Navahos. To meet specific requests of individual prospectors, the Council met in formal session four
times prior to the actual discovery of oil. 35 The minutes of
these meetings are imperfect records; they indicate only that
the Navahos around Shiprock were reluctant to lease their
land, and that despite many bids they approved only two
leases between the time of the first meeting on May 7, 1921,
and the discovery of oil.
32. Green, Decisions of the Department of the Interior, Vol. 49, p. 140. The effect
of this sweeping decision was to withdraw immediately the Indian claim to title from some
acres of land of which the Navaho share totaled about
The five sub-agencies were: Western Navaho Agency with headquarters at Tuba
City, Arizona, created in
San Juan Agency at Shiprock, New Mexico,
Navaho
Agency (the original agency) at Ft. Defiance, Arizona,
Pueblo Bonito Agency at
Crownpoint, New Mexico,
and Leupp Agency at Leupp, Arizona,
Ruth Underhill, The Navajos (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
pp.
In
John Collier argued that there had been a Navaho Council "in existence
for many years" prior to 1923: U. S. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings,
Survey of Conditions of Indians of the United States (Washington: G.P.O.,
part II, p.
(Hereafter cited as Senate Survey.) My research in the National Archives
failed to uncover any documentation for this claim. On the contrary. the evidence is that
prior to the interest in oil there was not even an agency council except at Leupp, and this
was clearly under the thumb of the local agent. See Leupp,
San Juan
and
85. For the minutes of these meetings see San Juan
and

22,000,000
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9,000,000.
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The casual, almost careless way in which the San Juan
Council was created resulted in headaches for the Bureau
later. Since the Council was not designed as a permanent establishment, each time a prospector wanted to deal with it
permission had to be obtained from Washington and a call
issued. This clumsy and troublesome policy led the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Charles H. Burke, to advise Agent
Estep at the time of the third Council meeting to secure
"broad authority" from the Indians to lease their land so
that the Council would not have to be called each time. 36 Estep
was never able to secure this authority. As a result, when oil
was discovered and the clamor for leases intensified, the Indian Bureau was unprepared to handle them. To solve the
problem and to give all the Navahos a voice in the determination of oil policy, the Bureau resolved to create a new and permanent Council representing all the Navahos, and to appoint
a Commissioner who would handle all matters pertaining to
oil and gas leases.
On January 3, 1922, Herbert J. Hagerman, Territorial
Governor of New Mexico in 1906-1907, was appointed to the
post of Commissioner, and on January 27, 1923, a directive
was issued for the creation of an all Navaho Counci1. 37 Hagerman immediately left for Washington where he conferred
with Bureau officials and conducted a thorough examination
of the Navaho files. 38 At the completion of this study he returned to New Mexico and prepared for the first Navaho
Tribal Council meeting. As a result of a conference with
the Navaho agents, the directive for the Council was modi36. Burke to Estep. November 3. 1922. San Juan 83819-21-322.
37. I discovered the original telegrams from Secretary Fall and copies of Hagerman's
replies among a collection of Hagerman's private papers entrusted to Mrs. Charles H.
Dietrich of Santa Fe in a folder simply labeled "Fall folder...• These valuable records were
forwarded to the National Archives after Mrs. Dietrich's death in 1961. They were microfilmed by the University of New Mexico before shipment and are available in the Coronado
Room of the library. For lack of a better title, I shall designate future references to this
collection as the Dietrich CoUection.
.
38. The memorandum which Hagerman drew up after his study of the files is truly
remarkable in its grasp of the Navaho situation. See Hagerman Memorandum, January 17,
1923, Navaho 61584-24-150.
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fied to exclude some objectionable features of the original
document. 39
The first all-Navaho Tribal Council met at Toadlena, New
Mexico, on July 7, 1923. The meeting was short. Hagerman
made a brief statement explaining that the purpose of the
meeting was to secure permission from the delegates for the
federal government to lease the remainderof their oil and gas
properties. He assured them that their cooperation in this
matter would result in a greater effort by the government to
secure them more land. The Council then elected Chee Dodge,
prominent Navaho spokesman, to the office of Chairman, and
unanimously approved a resolution drawn up in Washington
which granted the Commissioner authority to sign all gas and
oil leases which might in the future be granted in b,ehalf of
the tribe. 40 The necessary. authority secured, Hagerman began making plans to lease the Navaho treaty preserve.
A major problem which now faced the Department of the
Interior was the decision to lease at all, for it was becoming
apparent in 1923 that the oil industry was in or approaching
a bad state of overproduction. Hagerman did not favor immediate exploitation but a test of possible oil-bearing structures. Whether as a result of Hagerman's reasoning or for
other reasons, the Secretary, in late August, 1923, decided to
lease a portion of the treaty reservation near the site of the
first discovery. Arrangements were made for a public auction
to be held in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on October 15.
Despite high hopes on the part of Hagerman, this first
auction did not net the Navahos a great deal. Only eight of
eighteen small tracts adjoining the proven field were bid on
for a total of $22,000. An additional $65,000 was obtained for
39. For the original directive see Senate Survey, part· II, pp. 4378-79. For the amended
directive see Ibid., pp. 4390-9l.
40. Proceedings of the Navaho Tribal Council, July 7, 1923, San Juan 91993-23-054.
John Collier later charged that Hagerman's appointment was part of the swindle planned
by Albert B. Fall to cheat the Navahos of their oil lands, and that the new Navaho Tribal
Council was a creature of the government designed to make the swindle legal. 1 do not
agree with either Collier's evaluation of Hagerman or his judgment on the Tribal Council,
and my reasons are given at length in my dissertation "The Navajos and Federal Policy,
1913-1935," on file in the University of New Mexico library.
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four unproven tracts in the general vicinity: Tocito Dome,
$46,000; Table Mesa, $17,000; Rattlesnake, $1,000; and
Beautiful Mountain, $1,000. A major factor in the cool reception afforded the auction was the fact that the day before
the sale the fourth well drilled on the proven structure turned
out to be a water well. 41
The plans for the formation of the Navaho Tribal Council
and the Santa Fe auction were approved after Secretary Fall
resigned on March 4, 1923. The Teapot Dome scandal had not
yet broken, and the newspapers generally attributed Fall's
decision to his inability to see eye-to-eye with President
Harding on a variety of issues. Fall was succeeded by Hubert
Work, a Colorado physician turned politician who, prior to
this appointment, had served as Postmaster General.
Even before Teapot Dome, Secretary Work was to learn
that Fall's administration was unpopular with a great many
people. A few days after he assumed his new duties, Work
was confronted by Commissioner Charles Burke who voiced
his opposition to Fall's ruling in the Harrison case, and urged
the Secretary to obtain an opinion on the ruling from the Department Solicitor. Burke's request was submitted to the Solicitor on April 18, 1923, and a few months later the latter
rendered his opinion that the Fall order was not valid. 42
Aware by now that all was not well in the Department, Work
resolved to meet growing public opposition to the government's Indian policy by issuing an invitation to some one
hundred distinguished citizens to meet with him in December
to discuss the problem.
The Council of One Hundred which met in Washington
on December 12-13, 1923, pulled no punches. Only the resolution on the status of executive order reservations concerns
us here. The committee advised that the Secretary should
immediately suspend all proceedings on the sale or lease of
oil, gas, and other minerals on or from executive order reser41. For the details of the auction see Sen<Lte Survey, part II, p. 4830. For the water
well see Hagerman to Work, Octoher 23, 1922, Navaho 80406-23-322.7.
42. U. S. House, Committee on Indian Affairs, He<Lrings on H. R. 15021, LeMing of
Executive Order Reserv<Ltions, 69th Cong., 2d sess., 1927, p. 14.
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vations, pending action by Congress which, it was hoped,
would "vest the title of these reservations in the Indians occupying them." 43 Work accordingly in mid-February, 1924,
forbade the issuance of further prospecting permits on executive order reservations, and submitted to the Attorney General of the United States a memorandum which requested a
ruling on two questions: (1) what title is acquired by the
Indians to lands withdrawn for their benefit by executive
order and (2) are such lands subject to the provisions of
the General Leasing Act of 1920? The beginnings of a battle
royal were underway.
On May 12,1924, Attorney General Harlan F. Stone rendered his decision on the two questions given him by Secretary Work. The General Leasing Act, he wrote, was not apapplicable to executive order Indian reservations. "The important matter, however," he continued, "is that neither the
Courts nor Congress have made any distinction as to the
character or extent of the Indians' rights as between executive order reservations and reservations established. by treaty
or act of Congress." 44 Until one of them did so, the matter of
title could not be definitely settled. In this way the issue of
title was thrown back on the Congress where it was warmly
debated for the next three years. The details of the battle are
too lengthy for recitation here but the major events can be
traced.
The first attempt to resolve the problem was made by
Secretary Hubert Work. Just before the Committee of One
Hundred met in Washington in December, 1923, Work introduced into both houses of Congress a bill which attempted a
compromise between the opposing factions. Under the provisions of this bill, all proceeds from the leasing of executive
order reservations would be deposited to the credit of the
tribe for whose benefit the reservation had been created.
43. U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Council
on Indian Affairs (Washington: mimeographed, 1923).
44. For the entire Stone decision see U. S. Department of Justice, Official Opinions
oj the AttorneYB-General of the United States; Vol. 34 (Washington: G.P.O., 1926), pp.
171-192.
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However, the leases themselves would be made in accordance
with the provisions of the General Leasing Act. No action
was taken on this bill in 1924, but in 1925 it was again
introduced.
Debate on the bill in 1925 revolved about the percentage
of royalties to be allowed the Indians. The House approved a
plan which would give all the royalties to the Indians subject
to a state production tax. Since Congress the year before had
passed a new Indian Oil Leasing Act amending the act of
1891 to permit, among other things, taxation of Indian oil
royalties "in all respects" the same as royalties from nonIndian lands (43 Stat., 244), to attach the provisions of this
act for the treaty reservations to the Work bill for executive
order reservations was to imply that the two were the same.
The Senate, however, successfully opposed this measure and
insisted that the Indians pay 37.5 % of their royalties to the
state in which the reservation was located, "in lieu of taxes;"
that is, the same share that the state would have received
under the General Leasing Act. The amended Work bill was
then killed in the House at the urging of Indian Commissioner Charles Burke. 45
Commissioner Burke undermined the Work bill because it
placed the leasing of Indian oil lands under the provisions of
the General Leasing Act. This meant that the supervision of
Indian leases would be entrusted not to the Indian Bureau
but to the General Land Office which had cognizance over the
public domain. Burke insisted that the same law apply to
both kinds of reservations; furthermore, he was opposed to
granting the states any portion of the Indian royalties. 46
With the defeat of Work's bill by his own Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, the initiative for a solution shifted to the
Congress. In February, 1926, Representative Carl Hayden
of Arizona presented a second plan. Hayden's proposal satis45. u. S. House, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 8829, Leasing of
Allotted Indian Lands, 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1926, pp. 70-71.
46. Ibid.. p. 71. Burke never went on record openly favoring the equating of treaty
and executive order reservations. J ahn Collier vehemently denounced the Commissioner for
his reluctance to take a stand on the issue, and maintained that he was perpetrating the
Fall scheme. In, my dissertation I ascribe other reasons for Burke's reticence.
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fied Burke's previous objection by providing that the leasing
of executive order reservations be in accordance with the
Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924. It attempted to compromise
between the Senate and Burke on the taxation of royalties,
giving 37.5% to the states provided that such monies be used
for the construction of public roads within the reservation,
or for the support of public schools attended by Indian childrenY Although he was not entirely satisfied with the bill,
Commissioner Burke gave it his support, stating that it was
essentially in accord with the Bureau's position since provision was made for expenditure of all the tax monies in behalf
of the Indian. 48
The Senate, however, was not placated. Senators Sam G.
Bratton of New Mexico and A. A. Jones of Arizona attempted
to block the Hayden bill by substituting measures of their
own. Jones wanted to make the General Leasing Act applicable to executive order reservations and to remove the strings
from the 37.5 % grant to the states. Bratton favored administration of the leases under the Indian Oil Leasing Act, but
wished also to free the states of any restrictions in the use of
their share of the Indian royalties. 49 Opposition to all three
bills was aroused when John Collier, Executive Secretary of
the American Indian Defense Association, bluntly declared
that all the proposals were dodging the real issue of Indian
title. Each of the bills, in one way or the other, he charged,
implied that title to executive order reservations was in the
federal government. It would be very difficult, "perhaps impossible," he said, to pass a law authorizing the development
of these areas without adopting a theory on the nature of
title. 50
As a result of Collier's opposition and the simultaneous
passage of a pork-barrel appropriation which saddled the
47. U. S. House, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearing8 on H.R. 9138. Leasing of
Executive Order Reservations, 69th Cong., 1st SeBS •• 1926, PP. 1-2.
48. Ibid., p. 23.
49. U. S. Senate. Committee on Indian Affairs. Hearing8 on S. 1722 and S. 3159.
Development of Oil and Ga8 Mining Law8 on Indian Re8ervation8, 69th Cong., 1st SeBS.,
1926. PP. 1-3.
50. Ibid., pp. 71. 75. 90.
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Navahos with a $100,000 levy for a bridge across the San
Juan River in Arizona, Congressional sentiment began to
turn against the pending bills. Senators Burton K. Wheeler
and Robert LaFollette pronounced in favor of administering
the leases under the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 and givhlg the Indians 100% of the roy~lties, subject to a st~te production tax. In May Senator Ralph H. Cameron of Arizona
introduced a bill which satisfied all of Collier's objections. Although this measure did not specifically equate the treaty and
executive order reservations, its implications were clearly in
that direction. This was so true that Senator Bratton, in a
last ditch attempt to overthrow the bill, introduced an amendment which would have declared that nothing in the bill
should be construed to affect the title to the lands in question
or to declare a permanent policy of Congress respecting such
titles. His amendment was defeated in committee by a six to
two vote. 51 On March 3, 1927, President Coolidge signed the
Cameron bill into law, thus ending the debate (44 Stat.,
1347).
The Indian Oil Act of 1927 marked a significant turning
point in the history of federal Indian policy. Since the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, the prevailing attitude of
Congress was to destroy the Indian land base. The legislation
of 1912 and 1918 forbidding the president to increase the
Navaho reservation by executive decree and the decision of
Secretary Fall in the Harrispn case were clearly in this tradition. Now the trend was reversed. Although the question of
title was never 'explicitly resolved, the debates revealed that
it was the intent of Congress to equate the treaty and executive order reservations as nearly as possible without making
a formal declaration to that effect. As if to make this clear
the act contained a clause which relieved the executive branch
of its power to restore executive order reservations to, the
public domain. The circle was rounded. From this time forward the opponents of the traditional Indian policy, led by
51. u. s. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 8159 and 4152, Development of Oil and Gas Leases on Indian Reservations; 69th Cong., 2d sess., 1926, Pp.
75,84.
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John Collier, made steady progress toward their goal of restoring the Indian reservations.

IV
Despite the furor occasioned by Fall's decision in the Harrison case, no oil was discovered on the executive order portions of the reservation until many years after the controversy had been resolved. Nor did the field discovered on the
treaty reservation make the Navahos wealthy. In 1927 the
market price of oil dropped disastrously with the result that
reservation production was curtailed. The Great Depression
and a partial failure on the Rattlesnake field in 1931 lowered
royalties from $119,425 in 1930 to $52,401. 52 Not until 1956
did oil royalties appreciably exceed this smaller figure. In all,
the royalties received from the time of the initial discovery
through 1937 amounted to only $1,227,705.19. 53 The effects
of the oil discovery were thus out of all proportion to the
value of the oil extracted. Not only did the discovery result
in the creation of the Navaho Tribal Council and the resolution of the status of executive order reservations, but it also
brought about the further expansion of the reservation to its
present boundaries.
At its annual meetings in 1926 and 1927 the Navaho
Tribal Council, prompted by Commissioner Hagerman; voted
to set aside 20 % and later 25 % of the annual oil royalties for
the purchase of additional land in Arizona and New Mexico
for those Navahos living outside the reservation boundaries.54
Although approved by the Navahos, this plan could not be
implemented, under the terms of the Indian Oil Leasing Act
of 1927, until it received Congressional approval. In early
1928 Senator Ashurst submitted a bill for this purpose.
52. Hagerman to Charles J. Rhoads, June 14, 1932, National Archives, Record Group
75, Special Agent's File, H. J. Hagerman, # 300. See also U. S. Department of the Interior,
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1994 (Washington: G.p.a., 1935), p. 98.
53. William Zimmerman to Senator Elmer Thomas, May 28, 1937, Navaho 15529-37-322.
54. Minutes of the Navaho Tribal Council, Ft. Defiance, Arizona, July 7-8, 1926, General Services, 34976-26-054. Minutes of the Navaho Tribal Council, Crownpoint, New Mexico, July 7-8, 1927, General Services, 26881-27-054.
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The Ashurst bill provided for a government expenditure
of $1,200,000, reimbursable from the Navaho tribal fund, for
the purchase of land and water rights for Navahos living on
the public domain. The figure was based on an estimate of
Navaho needs figured at 800,000 acres at an average price of
$1.50 an acre. 55 It was violently opposed in New Mexico and
there was some talk of making it applicable only to Arizona.
In the end, however, the substance of the bill was attached
to an urgently needed deficiency appropriation and by this
ruse became law (45 Stat., 899).
In 1929 the first step in the expansion of the reservation
was laid before the Council. It contemplated the expenditure
of $217,000 for three strategically located water holes in
Arizona, a fourth tract in New Mexico for the Enemy Navaho
near Ramah, and a fifth purchase of 94,000 acres of Santa Fe
land located in both Arizona and New Mexico. The Council
unanimously accepted the resolution and urged the expenditure of the entire $1,200,000 before prices went Up.56 Before
the 1930 meeting these areas had been purchased and, with
the cooperation of the new Secretary of the Interior, Ray
Lyman Wilbur, and the active backing of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, Charles J. Rhoads, Commissioner Hagerman began to draw up a master plan for the complete solution of the Navaho land problem. When finally completed in
1932, this ambitious program called for the addition of some
3,000,000 acres to the reservation by purchase, consolidation,
and transfer from other government agencies. 57
From the Forestry Service the Indian Bureau hoped to
get some land in the Tusayan National Forest which bordered
on the western extremity of the reservation in Arizona. There
was no opposition and in 1930 and 1931 acts were approved
55. U. S. House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Department of the Interior Appropriation BiU, Fiscal 1930, 70th Cong., 2d sess., 1928, p. 759.
56. The purchases were as follows: 20,000 acres near Tappan's Spring, Arizona, from
the Babbitt Brothers Co. for $60,000; 9,000 acres near Ramah, New Mexico, from the VOgt
Sheep Co. for $22,000; two tracts in the Castle Butte region of Arizona known respectively
as the Baily tract (147 acres for $7,000) and the Marty tract (10,240 acres for $34,000) ;
and the Santa Fe lands for $94,000.
57. U. S. Senate, The Navajo Indian Reservation, Doc. 16, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 1932.
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transferring 144,500 acres from the Forest to the Navaho
reservation (46 Stat., 378, 1204). From the General Land
Office the Bureau sought a 600,000 acre tract in southern
Utah known as the Piute Strip. This area had once been administered as a part. of the Navaho reservation from 1884
to 1892, then restored to the public domain. Except for a brief
period in the 1920's during the oil boom, this rugged and generally forbidding space was not coveted by whites. By 1929
the oilmen had abandoned their sites and there was no good
reason for not giving it to the Navahos. Some delay was experienced over the terms of the transfer, but in 1933 the land
was at last turned over to the Navahos with the understanding that if oil were ever discovered, 37.5 % of the royalties
would be given to the state of Utah (47 Stat., 418).
Where white land interests were involved the Navahos
encountered resistance. The purchase of the three water holes
in Arizona in 1929 was designed to insure Navaho control
over a much larger area of grazing land until these lands
could be purchased. But the prospect of greater Navaho ownership in the three Arizona counties of Coconino, Navaho,
and Apache, alarmed the taxpayers there who complained
that their tax structure, already weakened by the depression
and drought, would be further endangered if the land passed
to the Indians and thus became hnmune to taxation. A meeting of interested parties held in Winslow, Arizona, in
1931 resulted in local support for' a plan whereby railroad
land and Navaho allotments would be exchanged and blocked
and the Navahos permitted to buyout several white ranchers. 58 Opposition to the extension in New Mexico could not
be resolved and, since the proposed additions in both states
were incorporated into one bill, the measure went down to
defeat in 1931, 1932, and 1933.
Opposition to these bills actually stemmed from two
sources. On the one hand, Senators Bratton and Cutting of
58. For the Arizona opposition see U. S. Senate, Improvement of Conditions on Indian
Reservations in Arizona, Doc. 16, 7lst Cong., 1st sess., 1929, p. 80. For the Winslow meeting see Hagerman to Rhoads, August 1, 1931, General Services, 35878-31-054.
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New Mexico, speaking for the stockmen of their states,
opposed any and all attempts to enlarge the reservation in
New Mexico except by consolidation under the act of 1921.
On the other hand, John Collier fought the clause in the bills
which would have relinquished the Navaho right to allotment
once the boundary extension were concluded. It was Collier's
argument that, since the Navahos in New Mexico required
1,350,000 acres but under the provisions of these bills would
only get 243,000 acres, the right to allotment must be
preserved. 59
Since no opposition was offered by Collier or the citizens
of Arizona to the extension there, separate bills for the two
states were introduced in 1934. Each provided for the relinquishment of privately owned lands within the proposed reservation extensions, the owners to be permitted to select other
public lands within the same county. In addition, certain privately owned lands could be purchased by the Navahos outright. For this purpose $482,136 for New Mexico and $481,879 for Arizona, reimbursable from the Navaho treasury,
were authorized. 60 Secretary Harold L. Ickes assured local
residents of both states that the proposed extensions were
"the ultimate line to which the Indians can hope to expand
the reservation." The Arizona bill was passed (48 Stat., 860),
thus adding approximately 1,000,000 acres to the reservation,
but the New Mexico opposition held fast and defeated the
extension in their state. The best the Navahos were able to
do in New Mexico was to exchange some 245,898 acres with
the Santa Fe and to purchase an additional 123,678 acres in
McKinley County from the New Mexico and Arizona Land
Co., a subsidiary of the Frisco. 61
59. Hagerman maintained that some concession must be made to the traditional New
Mexican opposition, and he charged Collier was antagonizing the New Mexican stockmen
unreasonably with his demands for future allotment. Collier was undoubtedly right in
principle. but his dogmatic stand, as Hagerman had warned, ended in defeat for the New
Mexico extension.
60. U. S. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs. Define the Exterior BoundaTieB of the
Navajo ReBCTvation in New Mexieo and for Other PurpoBeB, 73d Cong., 2d sess.• 1934,
Rept.1074.
61. For the Santa Fe negotiations see William S. Greever, Arid Domain (Stanford:
Stanford University Press. 1954). PP. 133-135. For the New Mexico and Arizona Land Co.
transaction see the company file #117 in the Korber Building, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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Bills for the extension of the reservation in New Mexico
were introduced regularly throughout the remainder of the
1930's, but the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934
rang down the curtain on any serious negotiations along this
line. The purpose of the Taylor Act was to put a halt to overgrazing on the public domain. To establish effective control,
all public lands in the West were withdrawn from entry,
thus ending the threat of future Navaho allotments. The
white stockmen, confident now that they could dominate the
range through their control of the advisory boards established by the act, saw no need to make any concessions to the
Navahos. The boundaries of the reservation today are substantially those worked out in 1934.

